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Abstract:  
Wider participation in stockholding is often presumed to reduce wealth inequality. We 
measure and decompose changes in US wealth inequality between 1989 and 2001, a period of 
considerable spread of equity culture. Inequality in equity wealth is found to be important for 
net wealth inequality, despite equity’s limited share. Our findings show that reduced wealth 
inequality is not a necessary outcome of the spread of equity culture. We estimate 
contributions of stockholder characteristics to levels and inequality in equity holdings, and we 
distinguish changes in configuration of the stockholder pool from changes in the influence of 
given characteristics. Our estimates imply that both the 1989 and the 2001 stockholder pools 
would have produced higher equity holdings in 1998 than were actually observed for 1998 
stockholders. This arises from differences both in optimal holdings and in financial attitudes 
and practices, suggesting a dilution effect of the boom followed by a cleansing effect of the 
downturn. Cumulative gains and losses in stockholding are shown to be significantly 
influenced by length of household investment horizon and portfolio breadth but, controlling 
for those, use of professional advice is either insignificant or counterproductive. 
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1.  Introduction 
Participation of households in risky assets, especially in direct and indirect 
holdings of stocks grew substantially over the 1990s.
1 The increase in household 
participation in stockholding over the past fifteen years has been so dramatic that its 
aggregate implications merit careful study. Such implications include effects of increased 
stockholding participation on the equity premium, stock market volatility, and the 
distribution of wealth. A small number of interesting theoretical papers on these issues 
serve to highlight several important conflicting considerations that need to be taken into 
account, but make obvious that we are still far from conclusive answers.
2  
This paper focuses on implications of the spread of equity culture for the 
distribution of wealth, using data from several Surveys of Consumer Finances. Wealth 
inequality is of interest not only in its own right, but also because households at different 
points of the wealth distribution exhibit different financial and entrepreneurial behavior. 
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) have recently documented that a positive relationship between 
wealth and entry into entrepreneurship can be found only at the top five percentiles of the 
wealth distribution. Carroll (2001) showed that the portfolio behavior of rich households 
is quite different from that of households lower in the distribution of wealth, and richer 
households are not simply blown-up versions of poorer households. Wolff (1998) shows 
that only the top 20 percent of households enjoys higher mean net worth and financial 
wealth levels between 1983 and 1995, while the other groups undergo real wealth or 
income losses with the shortfall being more severe for the poor. 
There is some theoretical justification for claims that increased stock market 
participation reduces wealth inequality. Arrow (1987) has stressed the inequality 
reducing effects of more households gaining access to financial instruments that bear an 
expected return premium. The findings of Guvenen (2002) support the notion that limited   2
stock market participation can account for much of US wealth inequality. It would not be 
unreasonable to infer from these findings that expanding participation is likely to reduce 
wealth inequality, by reducing the departure from full participation in the stock market.  
Theoretical ambiguities arise, however, when full financial information and 
sophistication are not taken for granted among all participating households. Peress (2002) 
allowed investment in financial information to be costly and subject to the choice of 
market participants. In his model, greater participation could encourage more people to 
get informed about stock performance and sound practices of portfolio management. 
However, Peress also pointed to a conflicting effect on incentives to acquire information. 
With an expanded stockholder base, financial risk is spread among a greater number of 
investors, thus reducing incentives for each to invest in costly information acquisition, 
including incumbent stockholders. 
Our basic premise in this paper is as follows. The empirical stock market 
participation literature has established that stockholders are not randomly drawn from the 
population. Certain characteristics, such as being income-rich, more educated, and less 
risk averse, have been found to make a household more likely to overcome entry costs 
and become a stockholder.
3 It follows that, as the stockholding participation margin 
spreads, the composition of the stockholder pool changes. Now, it is natural to think that, 
as more and more marginal investors are drawn into the market, the configuration of 
characteristics becomes less conducive to sizeable equity wealth. Yet, this is not 
necessarily true, as increased participation can be accompanied by substantial exits and 
entries into the pool. Moreover, it is useful to know if changes in levels of equity wealth 
as stockholding participation spreads are optimal given the new stockholder 
characteristics, or whether they result in part from changes in the ability of the 
stockholder pool to achieve gains and avoid losses in the stock market.   3
In this paper, we use data from the 1989, 1998, and 2001 waves of the US 
Surveys of Consumer Finances, the best source on household portfolios worldwide, to 
study these issues. Our analysis starts with a decomposition of net total wealth inequality 
and financial wealth inequality into their various sources (sections 2 and 3). We find that 
inequality in stock wealth has gained considerable importance as a source of overall net 
wealth inequality, despite the fact that equity represents a relatively small share of net 
wealth. 
We then focus on equity wealth. In Section 4, we estimate the influence of 
household characteristics on levels and inequality of equity holdings. We use these 
estimates to construct counterfactual distributions of equity holdings that separate 
changes in the influence of investor characteristics from changes in the distribution of 
such characteristics as equity culture spreads. We find that the configurations of 
stockholder characteristics in both 1989 and in 2001 were more conducive to equity 
holdings than that of 1998 stockholders.  
We next investigate whether these changes in equity holdings are fully accounted 
for by changes in “fundamental” economic characteristics of stockholders or are partly 
attributable to changes in ability of the stockholder pool to generate high equity wealth. 
Section 5 decomposes counterfactual effects of characteristics and shows that both 
economic fundamentals and financial attitudes and practices are likely to have played a 
role in changing the distribution of equity levels. Section 6 shows that effects of 
education, originally included under fundamentals, are sizeable and argues by use of 
econometric and computational techniques that even part of these may reflect differences 
in investor abilities. In Section 7, we show that household financial attitudes and 
practices contribute to achieving cumulative gains or avoiding losses in stockholding,   4
even when controlling for other factors, both for direct and for indirect stockholding, and 
for 1998 and 2001. Section 8 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Inequality Indices 
We use data from the United States Surveys of Consumer Finances, for 1989, 
1998, and 2001. The data are particularly well suited for analysis of wealth holdings, 
since they over   sample the rich and they are not subject to top-coding of wealthy 
households carried out in other surveys.
4 Definitions and details on the construction of 
the variables are provided in the Data Appendix. 
Inequality indices often give different pictures of inequality, because they differ in 
their sensitivity to inequality in various parts of the distribution. We compute four 
measures of inequality. The first three belong to the so-called “generalized entropy class” 
(abbreviated as GE). Mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) of variable y with mean μ and n 
observations is defined as: 
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It can be shown that the more positive a is, the more sensitive GE(a) is to inequality at 
the top of the distribution. The fourth index is the Gini coefficient, which is most 
sensitive to income differences about the mode of the distribution:   5
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Table 1 shows that these four inequality indices for net overall wealth in 1989, 
1998, and 2001 yield quite different pictures of the trend in net wealth inequality. MLD 
suggests a sizeable decrease in inequality between 1989 and 1998, followed by an 
increase to a level in 2001 that falls short of inequality at the starting point. The Theil and 
HSCV indices suggest increased inequality in 1998 compared to 1989, followed by a 
reduction in inequality between 1998 and 2001. The two indices differ in comparing the 
two end points in the period under consideration, with HSCV implying lower inequality 
in 2001 even compared to 1989. Finally, Gini suggests a slight increase in net wealth 
inequality over time.  
Differences in implications of inequality indices reflect the difficulty of capturing 
changes in a whole distribution by a single number. Index differences can be traced to the 
different weights attached by each index to transfers from rich to poor at various points in 
the distribution.
5 Theil’s index is influenced by the relative distance between the rich and 
the poor, attaching more weight to transfers at the lower and at the upper end. HSCV is 
very sensitive to changes in the upper tail of the distribution: it is very sensitive to 
inequality at high wealth levels but not so good at capturing inequality at other regions of 
the distribution (Cowell, 1977; Shorrocks, 1980). The patterns we observe suggest that 
movements in HSCV and Theil are caused mainly by what happened at the upper end of 
the wealth distribution, with net wealth inequality increasing during the stock market 
upswing of the 1990s and diminishing during the subsequent downturn. The Gini 
coefficient tends to attach more weight to wealth transfers that occur around the middle 
net wealth classes and so may miss and mask changes in inequality that arise from   6
developments at other parts of the distribution. Gini suggests a slight increase in 
inequality throughout the period under examination.  
 
3.  Inequality Decomposition by Sources 
The literature of inequality decompositions by source shows that, we can express net 
total wealth inequality in a given year, W I , as an exact sum of the contributions made by 
its various factor components:   
Wf
f
I S =∑       ( 5 )  
A wealth factor component contributes to increased (reduced) inequality if  f S > 0 (<0). 
The share of a particular factor f,  f s , in generating inequality is defined as: 
f
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HSCV seems an appropriate choice of index for wealth inequality 
decompositions, since it has desirable decomposability properties and it can handle the 
regular incidence of zero assets.
6 In what follows, we will focus on HSCV and on the 
often used Gini index. 
 
3.1. Decomposition of HSCV by Sources 
Shorrocks (1982) proved that, under certain axioms, there is a unique 
“decomposition rule”, according to which the proportionate contribution of factor f can 
be derived  − for a broad set of inequality measures − from: 
  2
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This is actually equivalent to the OLS estimated slope coefficient from the regression of 
wealth factor f on net total wealth W.  
When inequality is summarized by HSCV, 
f
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This expresses the proportionate contribution of factor f in terms of factor correlation 
with total net wealth  fW ρ , the factor’s share in net total wealth  f χ , net total wealth 
inequality   W I  and the factor inequality  f I , both measured by  the HSCV. Thus, the 
absolute contribution of factor f is:  f fW f W f SI I ρχ = .  
The percentage of factor owners  f n
+  and the inequality they exhibit among them 
f I
+ have an indirect effect on the factor contribution to inequality, given by: 
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 (Jenkins, 1995). In our tables presenting wealth decompositions, 
we report along with factor correlations, factor shares, and factor inequalities, 
percentages of factor owners, and within factor inequalities.  
Finally, we also report a measure of each factor’s contribution to the evolution of 
inequality over time. A factor making an important contribution to total inequality in a 
given year does not necessarily play a prominent role in inequality changes over time. 
Following Jenkins (1995) we decompose HSCV trends over time as: 
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Δ= = Δ ∑ , where a large positive value of sƒ%ΔSƒ suggests an 
important role for factor f  in raising total inequality over time. 
Table 2 shows decompositions of inequality, as measured by HSCV, by sources. 
Risky real assets are the dominant source of overall net wealth inequality, making a more 
than 50 percent contribution in all three years. Ownership of risky real assets (excluding   8
primary residence) along with business equity is more prevalent among wealthier 
segments of the population, and ownership rates do not exhibit any strong trend between 
1989 and 2001, hovering around 27 percent. Not surprisingly, risky real assets exhibit 
high degree of inequality and high correlation with overall net wealth. Yet in 1998, the 
year that overall inequality spikes by the HSCV measure, the absolute factor contribution 
of risky real assets and business equity increases only slightly (from 9.62 to 10.9). This is 
because the dropping factor share and correlation with net total wealth moderate the 
effects from the increase in this factor’s inequality. Given the much higher increase in net 
total wealth inequality, the proportionate factor contribution actually drops (from 0.72 to 
0.60).  
Between 1989 and 1998, equity holdings exhibit a high increase in factor share, 
increased correlation with net total wealth, and increased inequality, all leading to a more 
than quadruple increase in their absolute factor contribution. In 1998, wealth in equity 
holdings records a more than 25 percent proportionate contribution towards total 
inequality from just 7 percent a decade ago. Directly and indirectly held equity plays the 
dominant role in the increase of overall net wealth inequality by 1998.  
Between 1998 and 2001, reduction in inequality of equity holdings (attributable 
mainly to reduction in inequality among equity holders) more than outweighs the 
increase in their relative correlation and share, contributing to a fall in net total wealth 
inequality. By contrast, wealth in primary residence, which represents the largest part of 
total net wealth throughout the period, has a much smaller effect on net wealth inequality 
and one not consistent with the overall trend.
7  
 
3.2. Decomposition of the Gini Index by Sources 
Despite the different trend in inequality suggested by the Gini coefficient, results   9
from Gini decompositions lend further support to the significant role of equity holdings 
for the distribution of households’ net wealth. One of the most commonly used 
decompositions of the Gini index is that of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) According to 
this, the absolute contribution of wealth factor f to overall inequality can be expressed as: 
  f fff W SG R χ =       ( 8 )  
where  f G  is the inequality of factor f measured by Gini,  f χ  is the share of factor f in net 
total wealth, and  fW R  is the “rank correlation ratio” defined as the ratio of the covariance 
of household’s amount of wealth factor f with its ranking in the cumulative distribution of 
net total wealth, over the covariance of its amount of wealth factor f with its ranking in 
the cumulative distribution of factor f. Wealth in equity holdings displays one of the 
highest rank correlation ratios, that is also getting higher over time. This stresses the 
growing importance of risky financial assets for households’ position in the overall net 
wealth distribution. Table 3 decomposes inequality of net total wealth as summarized by 
the Gini coefficient. In the period 1989-98, only equity exhibits an increase in its 
(absolute and proportionate) contributions to net wealth inequality. The main factor 
behind this increased contribution is the rise in its share of net total wealth over this 
period.
8  
 
3.3.Contributions of Direct and Indirect Stockholding to Financial Wealth 
Inequality 
We now take a closer look at financial wealth and distinguish between the 
contributions of direct and indirect equity holdings to inequality (Table 4). Financial 
wealth inequality, as summarized by HSCV, follows a qualitatively similar pattern with 
net total wealth and equity holdings: 14.6 in 1989, rising to 21.9 in 1998, and then 
dropping to 16.6 in 2001. Key to the increase in financial wealth inequality in 1998 is the   10
increase in inequality of directly held equity, from 66.6 in 1989 to 162.5 in 1998 (the 
latter can be mainly attributed to the fact that inequality among stockholders triples this 
year, reflecting the very different risky wealth levels they attain by the end of the stock 
market upswing). Directly held equity becomes the main source of inequality in financial 
wealth by 1998, with its percentage factor contribution rising from just 20 percent in 
1989 to almost 52 percent in 1998.  
Indirectly held equity also makes an important contribution to changes in 
financial wealth inequality. The HSCV of indirect stock holdings displays a dramatic 
reduction from 53.1 in 1989 to 26.7 in 1998. Since within inequality is almost unchanged, 
this results mostly from the significant increase in the percentage of owners. However, 
the increases in the factor share of indirect equity holdings and in their correlation with 
financial wealth dominate the drop in HSCV and produce a positive contribution to the 
increase in financial wealth inequality between 1989 and 1998.  
Direct and indirect equity holdings contribute to lowering financial wealth 
inequality during the subsequent stock market downturn, as inequality among owners in 
both categories drops in 2001. Interestingly, participation rates in direct and indirect 
equity holdings keep increasing somewhat to 2001, despite the downturn.
9  
A closer look at participation can be provided by probit regressions for 1989, 1998, 
and 2001 data. In Table 5, we see that being affluent, more educated, and less risk averse 
contribute to the probability of entering the stock market, controlling for other factors. 
These results are consistent with standard findings in the stock market participation 
literature. They imply that stockholders are not drawn randomly from the population, but 
the composition of the stockholder pool changes as stock market participation spreads. We 
now turn to an examination of the contribution of stockholder characteristics to generating 
inequality in equity holdings.   11
 
4.  Regression-based Decomposition of Inequality in Equity Holdings 
Regression-based decomposition of inequality in equity holdings allows us to 
isolate, in a multivariate setting, the inequality contributions of certain demographic 
characteristics. Such decomposition is conducted on the basis of OLS regressions of the 
logarithm of equity holdings on a set of covariates including household demographics 
and financial characteristics. The importance of each explanatory variable for inequality 
cannot be seen from estimated coefficients alone. Fields (2002, 2003) showed that, given 
a process for generating lnY, under certain axioms, decomposition of inequality in 
variable lnY into the contributions of each of the J covariates (excluding the constant), Zj 
with estimated coefficient aj is given by:  
2
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inequality index  1 (ln ,..........,ln ) n I YY  that is continuous and symmetric, and for which the 
index under complete equality is zero, i.e. I(μ,μ,…,μ) = 0. 
We focus on the contributions that various factors make to inequality in equity 
holdings in each of the three years. We confine attention to holders of risky assets, i.e. 
those who have passed the participation threshold. Table 6 presents OLS coefficient 
estimates. Table 7 examines the total contribution of each variable and shows that, 
education, age, income, and reporting a bequest motive play the biggest role in 
generating inequality of equity holdings.
10 By contrast, some other variables that are 
statistically significant in the regression, such as self employment, marital status, and   12
willingness to take above average financial risk, play a very limited role in inequality, if 
any.  
In Figure 1, we plot risky wealth densities for 1989, 1998, and 2001. Kernel 
densities for the logarithm of equity holdings of stockholders in 1989 and 1998 suggest 
clearly a movement of the distribution to the right. Changes between 1998 and 2001 are 
less pronounced and more difficult to assess visually, but they still suggest some shift of 
the distribution to the right. 
We next decompose the change in the distribution of equity holdings between two 
years into (i) a component due to the change in the distribution of covariates; and (ii) a 
component due to changes in the coefficients on these covariates at various quantiles.
11 
This is done by constructing counterfactual densities that disentangle changes in levels of 
equity holdings emanating from changes in the composition of stockholders, from those 
due to changes in the effect of any given characteristic on realized equity levels. The 
basic methodology, a variant of a technique proposed by Machado and Mata (2003) 
described in Appendix A, uses results from quantile regressions to simulate appropriate 
distributions.   
When comparing 1998 to 1989, the relevant counterfactual density is the density 
of the (logarithm of) equity holdings that stockholders in 1989 would have if, given their 
own characteristics, they experienced the same influence of characteristics on equity 
holdings (‘coefficient effects’) as those experienced by stockholders in 1998. The 
difference between the 1998 and 1989 distributions of equity holdings is decomposed 
into: 
98 89 98 * 89 98 * 89 98 89 () () { () ( ; ) } { ( ; ) () } fy fy fy f y Xb f y Xb fy −= − + −    (10) 
where y represents the log of equity wealth, X is the data matrix and b is a collection of 
estimated quantile regression coefficients at various percentiles.    13
The term in the first curly brackets measures the contribution of household 
characteristics to the overall difference between the 1998 and 1989 densities of equity 
holdings. The term in the second curly brackets measures the contribution of the quantile 
regression coefficients.  
The coefficient and covariate effects for 1998-1989 are presented in Figure 2a. 
Differences in distributions of equity holdings over this period are mainly driven by 
coefficient effects, and these become progressively more important at higher quantiles of 
the distribution. This is consistent with the exceptionally strong upward movement of 
stock market indices over this period and it suggests that a given change in characteristics 
has more important effects, during upswings, on the equity wealth of households with 
sizeable equity holdings. 
On the other hand, covariate effects are negative, implying that the combination 
of 1989 characteristics with 1998 coefficients would generate even higher equity 
holdings than what was actually observed for the more heterogeneous group of 1998 
stockholders. In other words, the overall distribution of shareholder characteristics in the 
wider stockholder base at the end of the 1990s was not as conducive to high equity levels 
as the 1989 distribution. This was most evident among households with large equity 
holdings.
12   
Findings are reversed when we compare 1998 with 2001 (Figure 3a). Here the 
counterfactual distribution is derived by combining 1998 coefficients with 2001 
characteristics: 
2001 98 2001 * 2001 98 * 2001 98 98 () ( ) { ()( ; ) } { ( ; ) ( ) } fy fy fy f y X b f y X b fy −= − + −      (11) 
We find that coefficient effects are negative, but covariate effects on equity holdings 
(displayed in the second curly brackets) are positive and increasing beyond the 40
th 
percentile of the distribution of stock wealth. This implies that the configuration of   14
stockholder characteristics of 2001 would have had higher equity levels in 1998, 
compared to those actually observed for 1998 stockholders. This is quite a striking 
pattern of effects produced by changes in the configuration of stockholder characteristics 
as the spread of equity culture progressed during the 1990s and early 2000s, and it is 
worthwhile probing further into what lies behind it. 
As the configuration of the stockholder pool changes, we may in principle find 
covariate effects because of differences across stockholder pools in optimal levels of 
equity holdings, or in the ability to produce high equity wealth outcomes, or some 
combination of the two. Disentangling the two is relevant for knowing whether general 
equilibrium effects of the spread of equity culture arise solely from changes in optimal 
asset demands and market liquidity or whether general equilibrium analysis should also 
allow for changes in the quality of the stockholder pool, measured in terms of its ability 
to generate high values of equity wealth.  
The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring the presence of such quality 
effects using three different but complementary approaches. We first examine which part 
of the counterfactual changes in equity holdings across percentiles is due to changes in 
characteristics that can be thought of as economic ‘fundamentals’ rather than to changes 
in the configuration of household financial attitudes and practices. Then, we ask whether 
even education effects, which we initially considered as purely ‘fundamental’, are 
confined to determining income processes without influencing stockholder quality. In the 
final section, we focus on reported cumulative gains or losses in stockholding by 1998 
and by 2001, and we test for a role of financial attitudes and practices controlling for 
other characteristics.
13 
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5.  Fundamentals versus Financial Attitudes and Practices: Counterfactual Analysis 
In this section, we proceed by decomposing the counterfactual analysis presented 
above into a part that can be attributed to economically fundamental characteristics of the 
stockholder pool, and into one that can be attributed to differences in their financial 
attitudes and practices. We are conservative in what we consider as fundamental factors, 
as we classify as ‘fundamentals’ even factors that may also influence attitudes and 
practices, such as education.
14  
We consider three basic attitudes, namely financial alertness, willingness to take 
more than average risk, and intension to leave a bequest. We perform the following 
sequential decomposition:  
98 89 98 ** 98 89 98
** 98 89 98 * 89 98
*8 9 9 8 8 9
()() { () ( ; , ,) }
                          { ( ; , , ) ( ; )}
                           { ( ; ) ( )}
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−= −
+−
+−    (12) 
Where the counterfactual f** represents the equity wealth distribution that would have 
prevailed in 1998 if the particular attitudes had been distributed as in 1989. The term in 
the second curly bracket shows the relative contribution of fundamentals.  
  Figure 2b exhibits this decomposition of covariate effects for the 1989 to 1998 
period. The shaded area represents the effects of changes in covariates that we 
conservatively assigned to the group of economic ‘fundamentals’. The Figure shows that 
fundamentals make a contribution to equity levels, but they also leave room for a 
contribution of attitudes and practices throughout the distribution of equity holdings, but 
especially at the upper end of the distribution. 
Figure 3b carries out an analogous exercise for the period between 1998 and 
2001. Here we use the following sequential decomposition:   16
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Results are quite similar, with greater room for effects of attitudes above roughly the 70
th 
percentile of the distribution of equity holdings. 
This counterfactual analysis suggests that the period 1989-1998 has witnessed a 
dilution of the quality of the stockholder base, as more marginal stockholders were drawn 
into the market. The subsequent, 1998-2001 period is even more interesting, as it seems 
to combine an improvement in the stockholder base coupled with an increase in overall 
participation. To put it differently, this analysis suggests that the stock market downswing 
has had a ‘cleansing effect’ on the stockholder pool, by encouraging lower-quality 
investors to leave and (a slightly larger number of) better-quality investors to enter. The 
next two approaches we take reinforce the view that quality effects are present and 
contribute further findings. 
 
6.  Fundamentals versus Attitudes and Practices: Exploring the Role of Education 
6.1. Estimation of Education Effects on Inequality 
  In the decomposition shown in Figures 2b and 3b, we assigned education effects 
entirely to effects of ‘economic fundamentals’ and still found that they left room for 
effects of financial attitudes. It is often argued that education influences not only labor 
income processes but also an individual’s ability to make sound choices, including 
financial ones. Here we probe further into the role of education in determination of equity 
holdings and ask whether estimated effects of education can be attributed entirely to 
differences in income processes they entail.  
  Table 8 first computes various measures of inequality of equity holdings in 1998,   17
considering observed holdings, and observed holdings after removing the estimated effect 
of education.
15 Then, the same exercise is repeated for each of three educational 
categories: high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, and households whose head has 
a college degree or more.  
  We find that inequality of observed equity holdings, as measured by HSCV, drops 
as we move to higher education categories. By contrast, the Gini coefficient increases 
with education. These findings combined suggest that higher education categories exhibit 
less inequality in the upper tail of the distribution of equity holdings, but more inequality 
in the middle of the distribution.
16 
Of course, this does not necessarily imply that education per se is the cause of 
those differences, as these may be partly due to different distribution of other 
characteristics in the three education categories. The second column of the table reports 
inequality measures after removing the estimated effect of years of education. The top 
panel shows that observed heterogeneity in years of education raises HSCV quite 
dramatically, while effects on Gini and Theil indices tend to be small. The remaining 
panels show that, in the absence of heterogeneity in years of schooling, differences in 
inequality across education categories using the HSCV measure would be almost ironed 
out, while the Gini would be hardly affected.
17 These findings suggest that most of the 
effect of heterogeneity in education on inequality of equity holdings is observed in the 
upper tail of the distribution, whether we speak about the population as a whole or about 
any of the three education categories.  
  Is lower inequality in equity holdings among households of higher education due 
to greater ability to handle the challenges of investing in stocks or does it arise from the 
‘fundamentals’ of education (age-income profiles and income shock processes) that 
produce less unequal levels of stock holdings in the upper tail of the distribution even   18
under optimal behavior? We turn next to a simulation of optimal portfolio behavior using 
an intertemporal model of household portfolio choice.  
 
6.2. Education Effects in Simulation of Optimal Behavior 
We simulate optimal behavior of households that solve an intertemporal model of 
household portfolio choice, belong to different education categories, and differ only in 
terms of education-specific income processes (age-income profiles and income shock 
variances). Distributions of stock holdings within each education group are generated 
solely by different realizations of income shocks for households that face the same income 
processes ex ante and have the same remaining characteristics. 
The portfolio model incorporates finite lifetimes of uncertain length, a retirement 
period, and income shocks, transitory and permanent (see Appendix B).
18 Consistent with 
empirical estimates, more educated categories are assumed to face better income prospects, 
both in terms of steeper income growth and higher expected future income levels compared 
to their counterparts with lower education; and typically lower variance of income shocks. 
We simulate stock holdings implied by the model using stochastic draws of transitory and 
permanent income shocks, and of stock returns.
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Results are reported in Table 9. Mean simulated stock holdings for each category 
display a life-cycle pattern of asset accumulation when young, followed by asset 
decumulation in retirement. Comparison of mean stock holdings across education 
categories suggests that, if all other household characteristics were the same and only 
income processes differed across households of different education categories, lower 
education households should be holding more stocks on average than more educated 
households. This is because they face greater future income variance and worse future 
income prospects. Put differently, higher observed stock holdings among college graduates   19
participating in the stock market seem to be due to differences in their remaining 
characteristics and stockholding participation costs, and not to different income processes.  
Comparison of HSCV indices across education groups at any given age shows that 
educational attainment matters for simulated inequality in stock holdings, even under 
optimal portfolio behavior. Controlling for age and for all other relevant household 
characteristics, we find a monotonic positive relationship between educational attainment 
and inequality in stock holdings, with college graduates typically experiencing greater 
inequality than the other two categories. This suggests that the equalizing effect of higher 
education at the upper end of the distribution of equity holdings is unlikely to arise from 
the “fundamental” features of educational attainment, such as age-income profiles and 
income shocks processes under optimal behavior, leaving space for other factors, such as 
financial attitudes and practices, to operate even through the education variable.  
In the next section, we provide additional evidence in favor of the relevance of 
attitudes and practices by looking directly at their effects on reported cumulative gains and 
losses in the stock market.  
 
7.  Who Gains and Who Loses in the Stock Market? 
We estimate the contribution of household characteristics to gains or losses in 
stockholding by 1998 and then by 2001, separately for direct and indirect stockholding. 
Responses in the SCF allow us to measure success or failure with reference to the 
cumulative experience of each stockholder by 1998 or 2001, though without knowledge of 
when stocks were initially acquired. Thus, we can see how each stockholder survived a 
period ending with a considerable stock market rally, as well as one that includes an 
important part of the subsequent downturn. 
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7.1. Descriptive analysis 
The top two education categories almost share the pool of stockholders in both 
years, leaving only about 5% of the pool to high-school dropouts. Interestingly, there is a 
shift in the composition of the pool following the downturn, with the share of college 
graduates rising from 46.5% to more than 49%, at the expense of each of the lower two 
education categories (Table 10). 
The proportion of stockholders who include professional advice among reported 
ways in which they make decisions about savings and investments is 59% in 1998 and 
drops slightly to 57% in 2001, despite the intervening stock market downturn. Under 
professionals, we include accountants, bankers, brokers, and financial planners. Slightly 
lower proportions of stockholders, but still the majority, declare that they are influenced by 
social interactions in decisions about savings and investments. Here we include households 
who report that they get advice from their spouse or partner, a friend or relative, or some 
work or business contact. 
Table 11 shows how the three education categories fared in their direct stock 
holdings by the end of 1998 and 2001. By 1998, 80% of all direct stockholders were 
experiencing cumulative gains on their direct stock investments. Proportions increased 
with education, but the proportion for college graduates did not exceed 81%. Much less 
variation was observed in the percentages of those declaring cumulative losses, which also 
increased with education but very little, ranging between 11.4% and 12%.  
By 2001, the percentage of equity holders declaring that they had survived the 
downturn with cumulative gains in their direct stock investments dropped to 53%. A 
steeper education gradient was observed, with percentages rising from 41% for high school 
dropouts to 56% of college graduates with direct holdings. Percentages of those declaring 
cumulative losses had risen to 35% in the population, ranging from 43% to 33% across   21
education groups. Unlike in 1998, in 2001 more educated households reported smaller 
incidence of cumulative losses. Following the stock market downturn, outcomes were more 
differentiated across education categories, and the slope of the education gradient was 
greater for gains and a lot greater for losses than in 1998. 
Mutual fund investments are generally considered as being less demanding for 
households, since portfolios are constructed by professional fund managers and 
diversification is possible for each individual investor participating in a large portfolio. 
However, even participation in mutual funds is far from being straightforward. One 
complicating factor is the proliferation of mutual funds, whose number is now of the same 
order as the number of individual stocks. The question of which stocks to hold seems to 
have been replaced by the equally pressing question of which mutual funds to hold, given a 
household’s objectives and attitudes to risk. A further factor is the actual quality of 
professional advice given to shareholders of mutual funds and the potential of investors to 
pick qualified advisors and to monitor them. 
Comparing cumulative outcomes for direct stockholding and for mutual funds 
among all holders, one does find greater incidence of cumulative gains and smaller 
incidence of cumulative losses for mutual funds in each of the two years, though 
marginally so for losses in 2001. Yet, Table 12 shows that, in both 1998 and 2001, 
cumulative success and failure rates for mutual funds were much more differentiated across 
education categories than the corresponding rates for direct holdings of stock. For example, 
in 1998 only 69% of high-school dropouts were reporting cumulative gains, compared to 
89% of college graduates. By 2001, 52% of households in the least educated category were 
reporting cumulative losses, compared to less than 35% of the most educated households. 
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7.2. Regression Analysis 
Although these statistics raise suspicions against the often voiced view that mutual 
fund investment is a much simpler alternative to direct stock holding for households with 
limited ability to process financial information, they are not sufficient to establish a role for 
education in determining gains or loss outcomes, or to clarify the sources of this role. Is 
education relevant because it encourages households to adopt a longer investment horizon, 
to diversify, and to seek professional advice? Or is education relevant because it 
determines fundamentals, such as future income and employment prospects, controlling for 
the degree of financially sound behavior? In order to probe further into these questions, we 
turn to regression analysis of the incidence of stockholding outcomes, conditional on 
participation. 
We model the incidence of cumulative gains and losses as bivariate probits with 
selection. One outcome is direct holding of stocks (or mutual fund participation), and the 
second is observed only if the first outcome occurs, i.e. if households are direct 
stockholders (or mutual fund shareholders). We run two such estimations for 1998 (one for 
gains and one for losses), and two for 2001, separately for direct and indirect stockholding.  
Bivariate probit estimation with selection allows for correlation among unobserved 
factors contributing to the probability of the cumulative outcome and to the probability of 
direct stock ownership. When the correlation is statistically significant, we report 
conditional marginal effects from bivariate probits that have taken into account selection 
bias. When it is statistically insignificant, we report marginal effects from standard probits 
for gains and for losses on the restricted subsamples of direct (or mutual fund) 
shareholders.  
Results for direct stockholding in 1998 and 2001 are reported in Table 13. The 
period ending in 1998 includes the upsurge in stock prices without the subsequent   23
downswing, and 80% of direct stockholders reported cumulative gains. In col. 2, we see 
that married status is the only factor with statistically significant positive contribution (at 
5% significance level) to a cumulative gains outcome for direct stockholders in 1998.  
We test for the significance of three indicators of financial attitudes and practices. 
The number of stocks held can be called ‘portfolio breadth’ and suggests an effort to 
achieve portfolio diversification, although the extent of diversification achieved cannot be 
assessed without information on which stocks were held and on their covariance properties. 
Portfolio breadth has a positive and statistically significant contribution to the probability 
of achieving cumulative gains in 1998. Having a long investment horizon (in excess of 10 
years) indicates absence of excessive churning of stock holdings, but it is not found to 
make a statistically significant positive contribution to cumulative gains among 
stockholders in 1998. The same is true for reporting use of professional advice. 
Interestingly, once we control for these three variables showing financial attitudes 
and practices and for other remaining characteristics, we no longer find that educational 
attainment played a statistically significant role in achieving cumulative gains in 1998, 
although point estimates of marginal effects on the probability of gains are positive and 
increasing with education. Thus, the observed variation in the incidence of gains across 
education categories in Table 11 seems to be largely explained by variation in portfolio 
breadth and possibly in other characteristics that correlate with education, namely marital 
and employment status.
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Cumulative gains were the most usual outcome in 1998. Column 3 examines the 
incidence of the less likely outcome of cumulative losses. Here we find that long 
investment horizon had a strongly significant effect in reducing the probability of suffering 
cumulative losses, by about 4 percentage points. Portfolio breadth is estimated to 
contribute with the correct sign (significant at 10%), while professional advice has a   24
statistically insignificant effect, though the point estimate is negative. Again, once we 
control for these three variables and for other characteristics, education does not make a 
statistically significant contribution to avoiding cumulative losses in 1998. 
Some of the factors that played no role in 1998 gain significance when the period 
over which cumulative outcomes are assessed is extended to encompass the downswing in 
the early 2000s (cols. 4 and 5). It should be stressed that results refer to households who 
chose to stay in or enter the market following the downswing and are observed as 
stockholders in 2001.
21 Portfolio breadth is now statistically significant in facilitating 
cumulative gains among direct stockholders and in reducing the probability of cumulative 
losses. The same is true for having an investment horizon longer than 10 years, with 
marginal effects of the order of 6 percentage points. However, estimated marginal effects 
of using professional advice are statistically insignificant and of the wrong sign for direct 
stockholders. 
Even after controlling for these indicators of financial attitudes and practices, being 
a stockholder with a college degree has a remarkably large and significant positive effect 
on the probability of surviving the downswing with cumulative gains, raising it by 18 
percentage points. Although it is also estimated to reduce the probability of losses, the 
effect is not statistically significant. Thus, a college degree is estimated to make a 
difference in producing good outcomes in bad times. 
Having received an inheritance or been given substantial assets in a trust or in some 
other form also has a statistically significant and sizeable contribution to the incidence of 
making cumulative gains and to avoiding cumulative losses in bad times. It increases the 
probability of gains by 10 and reduces the probability of losses by 8 percentage points. 
This variable may be acting as a proxy for portfolios that were initiated earlier than the 
recent upswing and are therefore less likely to be suffering cumulative losses. Moreover,   25
since wealthier households are more likely to be leaving bequests, households who have 
received an inheritance are likely to have also inherited a portfolio structure and some of 
the financial expertise that contributed to making the previous generation wealthy.  
Table 14 presents results for indirectly held equity. In the period ending with the 
upswing of the late 1990s (cols. 2 and 3), the only notable statistically significant effect 
refers to breadth in mutual fund holdings, which reduces the probability of experiencing 
cumulative losses. The relevance of this factor suggests that the degree of diversification 
inherent in any given mutual fund, though greater than that typically observed among 
direct stockholders, can be further improved upon by combining a number of different 
mutual funds. It is also noteworthy that education, length of investment horizon, and use of 
professional advisors contributed neither to making cumulative gains nor to avoiding 
cumulative losses on mutual funds in the period that ends with the upswing of the late 
1990s. 
The period that includes the subsequent downswing stands in stark contrast to the 
period ending in 1998. A college degree is estimated to have increased the probability of 
cumulative gains among mutual fund holders by a staggering 30 percentage points, and to 
have reduced the probability of losses by 22 percentage points, controlling for income, 
length of investment horizon, receipt of inheritance, portfolio breadth, and other factors. 
College education appears as an important contributor to success, having even greater 
impact on the probabilities of gains and of losses for the arguably “softer” option of 
indirect stockholding than for direct holding of equity.  
Portfolio breadth is found to have a strongly statistically significant marginal effect. 
Holding shares in greater number of mutual funds both increases the probability of 
cumulative gains and reduces the probability of losses in mutual funds by 2001. Having an 
investment horizon longer than 10 years contributes to gains and to avoidance of losses by   26
7 and 8 percentage points, respectively, which is somewhat larger than estimated marginal 
effects for direct stockholding. 
Point estimates for use of professional advice imply a statistically significant (at 
10% level) perverse effect of reducing the probability of cumulative gains and increasing 
the probability of losses, controlling for investment horizon and portfolio breadth. In all 
our previously reported regressions, use of professional advice failed to make a difference 
to the cumulative outcome beyond any influence it may have had in lengthening the 
horizon and in broadening the portfolio of the household. These findings question the 
overall quality or scope of professional advice given to households, as long as we view the 
use of such advice as being a function of exogenous factors, such as ignorance or lack of 
time on the part of the household to delve into the intricate details of financial decision 
making. They would be weakened by strong evidence that use of financial advice is 
actually due to the absence of cumulative gains, suggesting endogeneity. We doubt that 
such factors are dominant here, as the use of financial advisors is typically observed among 
households with limited knowledge of the market or by financially successful households 
who do not have the time to monitor their own portfolios.  
Finally, being a male or white non-Hispanic mutual fund shareholder raises the 
probability of surviving the downswing with cumulative gains and lowers the probability 
of experiencing cumulative losses. Estimated conditional marginal effects are sizeable in 
both cases. Part of these effects may be due to these variables acting as proxies for future 
income prospects. At least the result for the race variable may be additionally suggesting 
that the mutual fund sector is targeting more aggressively households that do not belong to 
minorities. 
All in all, results in this Section suggest that the incidence of cumulative gains or 
losses in direct stockholding or in mutual funds is not simply determined by overall stock   27
market performance but also by demographic characteristics and practices of investing 
households. Education, portfolio breadth, and length of investor horizon seem important 
for making gains and avoiding losses, especially in the aftermath of stock market 
downswings. By contrast, use of professional advice is largely insignificant or even 
counterproductive, controlling for investment horizon and portfolio breadth.  
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have applied a battery of approaches to measuring and 
decomposing wealth inequality, using high-quality household-level data on portfolios 
during a critical phase in the spread of equity culture. We found the pattern of inequality 
in equity holdings to be important for inequality in overall net wealth in the United States 
over the fifteen-year period under consideration, despite their limited share in net wealth. 
Inequality decompositions reveal that a significant part of the contribution of equity 
holdings has to do with changes in inequality within owners of equity. Counterfactual 
distributions of equity holdings separating changes in the influence of investor 
characteristics from changes in the distribution of characteristics within the stockholder 
pool imply that the distribution of characteristics of the 1998 stockholder pool was less 
conducive to sizeable equity holdings, compared with either 1989 or 2001. We have 
employed three different approaches to show that this was unlikely to be due simply to 
changes in optimal holdings associated with fundamental household characteristics, but 
also to financial attitudes and practices. 
All in all, our findings suggest that reduced wealth inequality is far from being an 
automatic outcome of the spread of stockholding opportunities and of equity culture. 
Effects of increased participation on wealth inequality depend on how characteristics of 
the expanding pool of stockholders evolve, including their financial attitudes and   28
practices in handling complicated and risky financial instruments. The evolution of 
household characteristics, however, is the net result of exits and entries sensitive to the 
stock market environment, even if the overall participation rate continues to increase.  
The booming stock market of the 1990s seems to have raised the share of 
marginal stockholders in the pool, with characteristics, attitudes, and practices less 
conducive to large equity wealth. The subsequent stock market downturn between 1998 
and 2001 seems to have encouraged substantial exits and entries, with a net effect of 
actually improving the tendency of the stockholder pool to have large equity wealth, due 
partly to higher optimal holdings and partly to better financial attitudes and practices. In 
this sense, the US experience between 1989 and 2001 seems consistent with a ‘dilution 
effect’ of the stockholder pool arising from the stock market boom, followed by a 
‘cleansing effect’ of the stock market downturn. The relevance of financial attitudes and 
practices we found for observed equity outcomes suggests a role for financial education, 
transparency, and high-quality advice, as well as for policies promoting those. 
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Appendix A: The Machado-Mata Algorithm 
The algorithm for constructing counterfactual densities is a variant of Machado and Mata 
(2003), recently used by Albrecht et al. (2003) and Nguyen et al. (2003): 
 
1. Draw m random numbers from a uniform distribution on (0, 1):  12 , ,...... m θ θθ   ; here 
we set m=1000. 
2. For each  i θ  where i = 1,2,…,m, use the 1998 data on stockholders to estimate the 
Quantile Regression coefficient, 
98() i b θ , from the model: 
98 98 98 98 [| ] ()
i i Qy X X θ β θ =     
3. Make m random draws of characteristics and corresponding weights with 
replacement from the 1989 stockholder pool. Denote the outcomes of these draws by 
*89
i x  for i = 1,2,….,m. 
4. Generate counterfactual values (a random sample of size m from the desired 
distribution):  
** 8 9 9 8 () ii i yx b θ = , for i = 1,2,….,m. Use these values to generate 
*8 9 9 8 (; ) f yX b . 
 
Then, for each of the three sequences of variables (log equity holdings in 1989 and 1998 
and counterfactual values), we calculate percentiles using population weights. The 
difference between percentiles of the distributions of the endogenous variable in 1998 
and 1989 can be decomposed into: 
 
98 89 98 * 89 98 * 89 98 89 () () { () ( ; ) } { ( ; ) () } fy fy fy f y Xb f y Xb fy −= − + −     
 
The term in the first curly brackets represents the contribution of the covariates to the 
overall difference between the 1998 and 1989 densities. The term in the second curly 
brackets shows the contribution of the QR coefficients. The method is a generalization of 
Oaxaca (1973) to the whole distribution. 
 
We further decompose the covariate effects into the contribution made by household 
characteristics that can be seen as fundamentals and a remaining contribution that is due 
to particular attitudes and practices. We assess the contribution of three attitudes, namely 
financial alertness, willingness to take more than average risk, and intension to leave a 
bequest. To this end we use the following sequential decomposition:  
 
98 89 98 ** 98 89 98
** 98 89 98 * 89 98
*8 9 9 8 8 9
()() { () ( ; , ,) }
                           { ( ; , , ) ( ; )}
                           { ( ; ) ( )}
fa
fa
fy fy fy f y X X b
fy XXb f y X b
fy Xb f y
−= −
+−
+−
 
 
where the counterfactual
** f represents the equity wealth distribution that would have 
prevailed in 1998 if the particular attitudes had been distributed as in 1989. The term in 
the first curly bracket shows the relative contribution of attitudes, while in the second the 
relative contribution of fundamentals. 
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In order to construct the counterfactual
** f  we first divide each of the samples of equity 
owners in 1989 and 1998 into 8 cells representing all the possible combinations of the 
three attitudes. We follow steps 1 and 2 from above while in step 3 we make m random 
draws with replacement from 1998 sample, generating the 1998 equity wealth 
distribution implied by the model. Then we consider the subset of households in cell 1. 
We randomly draw with replacement observations from this subset to generate a relative 
sample size equal to the fraction of households in cell 1 in 1989. We repeat the last two 
steps for cells 2 to 8. A similar approach is followed for the period 1998-2001. 
 
 
Appendix B: The Portfolio Model 
 
This Appendix describes the main features of the model and calibration settings. 
More details on the model and its policy functions are to be found in Bilias and Haliassos 
(2004).  
 
    The household with access to stocks is assumed to have finite horizon but uncertain 
lifetime, and to maximize expected intertemporal utility faced with a menu of a risky and a 
riskless asset. The household's problem is given by: 
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All variables are in real terms. St is the real amount of total saving between periods t and 
t+1, αt is the portfolio share of the single risky asset (stocks), Et denotes the expectation 
operator based on information in t, β is the discount factor, sj is the probability that the 
household is alive in period j, conditional on being alive in period  j-1. U(Ct) is constant 
relative risk aversion felicity derived from consumption in t, Xt is cash on hand defined as 
the sum of net wealth and labor income,  1
~
+ t R  is the risky gross return on stocks between t 
and  t+1,  Rf is the gross riskless rate, Yt is non-interest income, and Pt refers to the 
permanent component of income, defined below. Income encompasses all after-tax income 
from transfers and wages, including pension income. Ft ≥ 0 is a fixed per period real cost of 
access to the stock market. Per period access costs are somewhat broader than the usual 
notion of participation costs, because they also incorporate costs that a household would 
have to incur to decide its portfolio even if it ends up choosing not to hold any stocks. The 
presence of constraint (16), which precludes borrowing at the riskless or the risky rate, 
generates ranges of cash on hand in which it is optimal to hold no stocks.  
 
Income of household i, Yit, is assumed to entail non-diversifiable risk because of 
moral hazard and adverse selection considerations. Observed income follows Yit=Pit Uit,    34
where Uit is a transitory shock. During working life, the permanent component, Pit, follows 
 
     Pit=Gt Pit-1 Nit                    (19) 
 
and is thus subject to shocks, Nit. Retirement income is assumed to be subject only to 
transitory shocks. Shocks are assumed i.i.d. lognormal. The growth factor, Gt, is assumed 
to be a function of household characteristics and is calibrated using empirical estimates for 
three different education categories (less than high-school education, high-school 
graduates, and college graduates), distinguishing between working life and retirement.  
 
In calibrating income processes, we distinguish between three education categories, 
based on the educational attainment of the household head: less than high-school 
education, high-school graduates, and college graduates (or more). Income processes differ 
across education groups, both in terms of the (deterministic) age-income profiles and of the 
processes followed by stochastic shocks. The other difference is in the ratio of the fixed 
participation cost to the permanent component of income, which tends to be greater for 
lower-education households as a result of the assumption that all households face the same 
absolute real cost.  
 
The growth factors of the permanent component of income are based on regressions 
using data from PSID 1983-1990 and are taken from Laibson et al. (2000, Tables 3 and 4). 
The retirement age for high-school dropouts is set to 61, for high-school graduates to 63, 
and for college graduates to 65, based on mean ages observed in the data. Estimated age 
income profiles are hump-shaped during working age for all education categories.  
We calibrate variances for income shocks, (σu²,  σn²), for the three education 
categories during working life using estimates of Carroll and Samwick (1997). For high-
school dropouts, we use the Carroll-Samwick estimates for those who had completed 
between 9 and 12 grades: (0.0658, 0.0214); for high-school graduates, we use (0.0431, 
0.0277); and for college graduates (0.0385, 0.0146).  
 
We follow Laibson et al. (2000) in calibrating shocks to retirement income. They 
estimate variances of transitory shocks for high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, 
and college graduates at 0.077, 0.051, 0.042, respectively.  
 
We use conditional probabilities of survival from the 1998 United States Life 
Tables (National Vital Statistics Report, 2001). We set the rate of time preference equal to 
0.05. The expected rate of return on equity, μr, is set to 0.06 and the constant real interest 
rate, r, to 0.01. Understating the historical equity premium is an often used shortcut to 
introducing proportional transactions costs. The standard deviation of the equity premium 
is at its historical value of 18 percent. The benchmark value for risk aversion is ρ=2. 
Perceived access costs are unobservable. We use a real amount of 250 dollars, close to 
empirical estimates of implied participation costs. Assuming the same real cost of 
participation regardless of education is a useful benchmark, but also consistent with our 
purpose of focusing on the implications of income processes as distinct from any 
differences in the ability to process financial information across education groups.  
 
The model is solved using a MATLAB algorithm recently developed by Haliassos 
and Mavridis, which incorporates some of the computational shortcuts proposed in 
Carroll (2002).   35
 
 
 
Table 1:  Net Wealth Inequality Indices 
  Generalized Entropy Class   
Year GE(0) 
MLD 
GE(1) 
Theil 
GE(2) 
HSCV 
Gini 
1989 1.9961  1.5035  13.316  0.7668 
1998 1.8391  1.6338  18.176  0.7741 
2001 1.9438  1.6114  12.405  0.7874 
Note: Weighted data from Surveys of Consumer Finances. The sample excludes households with negative net 
worth. 
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Table 2: Net Wealth Inequality Using HSCV: Decomposition by Sources 
 
  Year 
Net 
Total 
Wealth  
Wealth in 
Safe 
Financial 
Assets 
Wealth in 
Equity 
Holdings 
 
Net Wealth in 
Risky Real & 
Business 
 Equity  
Other 
Wealth  
Wealth in 
Primary 
Residence 
Principal 
Residence 
Debt 
Consumer 
Debts 
Percentage 
with positive 
factor wealth  
(nf
+ ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
0.958 
0.974 
0.972 
0.906 
0.937 
0.936 
0.348 
0.528 
0.549 
0.292 
0.273 
0.261 
0.857 
0.851 
0.871 
0.680 
0.704 
0.715 
 
0.418 
0.456 
0.469 
 
0.621 
0.616 
0.625 
Factor 
Share  
 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.251 
0.219 
0.212 
0.099 
0.254 
0.268 
0.355 
0.299 
0.288 
0.061 
0.053 
0.048 
0.354 
0.318 
0.305 
-0.093 
-0.114 
-0.101 
-0.029 
-0.028 
-0.022 
Correlation 
with net 
total wealth 
(ρfW) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.547 
0.569 
0.651 
0.455 
0.654 
0.689 
0.907 
0.864 
0.827 
0.272 
0.369 
0.375 
0.409 
0.411 
0.514 
-0.171 
-0.165 
-0.186 
-0.256 
-0.363 
-0.205 
Factor 
Inequalities 
(Iƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
13.316 
18.177 
12.405 
15.476 
14.024 
17.175 
33.437 
44.072 
23.341 
66.965 
98.888 
60.632 
31.989 
7.749 
7.921 
1.336 
1.364 
1.549 
2.441 
1.680 
1.822 
12.586 
25.979 
22.849 
Within Factor 
Inequality  
(If
+ ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
12.740 
17.686 
12.039 
13.981 
13.113 
16.041 
11.309 
23.020 
12.600 
18.961 
26.667 
15.438 
26.834 
6.517 
6.832 
0.749 
0.812 
0.966 
0.731 
0.494 
0.590 
7.626 
15.808 
14.091 
Proportionate 
Factors    
contributions 
(sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.148 
0.109 
0.163 
0.072 
0.258 
0.254 
0.723 
0.602 
0.527 
0.026 
0.013 
0.014 
0.046 
0.036 
0.056 
-0.007 
-0.006 
-0.007 
-0.007 
-0.012 
-0.006 
Absolute 
Factors    
contributions 
(Sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
13.316 
18.177 
12.405 
1.974 
1.988 
2.018 
0.954 
4.695 
3.147 
9.622 
10.938 
6.537 
0.340 
0.234 
0.179 
0.611 
0.650 
0.689 
-0.090 
-0.104 
-0.089 
-0.096 
-0.225 
-0.075 
Percentage 
change in 
source 
contributions 
(sƒ%ΔSƒ) 
 
 
1998-
1989 
 
2001-
1998 
0.365 
 
 
 
-0.318 
 
     0.001 
 
 
 
0.002 
 
 
0.281 
 
 
 
-0.085 
 
 
0.099 
 
 
 
-0.242 
-0.008 
 
 
 
-0.003 
0.003 
 
 
 
0.002 
-0.001 
 
 
 
0.001 
-0.010 
 
 
 
0.008 
 
Note: Weighted data from Surveys of Consumer Finances. The sample excludes households with negative net worth. 
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Table 3: Net Wealth Inequality Decomposition by Sources Using Gini 
 
 
Year 
Net 
Total 
Wealth  
Wealth in 
Safe 
Financial 
Assets 
Wealth in 
Equity 
Holdings 
Wealth in 
Risky 
Real 
Assets 
Other 
Wealth  
Wealth in 
Primary 
Residence 
Mortgage 
Debts 
Consumer 
Debts 
Factor 
Share  
(χƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.251 
0.219 
0.212 
0.099 
0.254 
0.268 
0.355 
0.299 
0.288 
0.061 
0.053 
0.048 
0.354 
0.318 
0.305 
-0.093 
-0.114 
-0.101 
-0.029 
-0.028 
-0.022 
Rank 
correlation 
ratio  
(RfW) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.913 
0.903 
0.916 
0.908 
0.933 
0.940 
0.944 
0.945 
0.948 
0.728 
0.655 
0.693 
0.821 
0.812 
0.842 
0.442 
0.444 
0.474 
0.384 
0.330 
0.300 
Gini Index 
(Gf) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
0.767 
0.774 
0.787 
0.817 
0.804 
0.827 
0.938 
0.905 
0.896 
0.944 
0.954 
0.954 
0.663 
0.617 
0.600 
0.644 
0.603 
0.623 
0.795 
0.748 
0.748 
0.784 
0.792 
0.775 
Proportionate 
Factors    
contributions  
(sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.244 
0.205 
0.204 
0.110 
0.277 
0.287 
 
0.417 
0.348 
0.332 
 
0.039 
0.028 
0.026 
0.244 
0.201 
0.204 
-0.043 
-0.050 
-0.046 
-0.011 
-0.010 
-0.006 
Absolute 
Factors    
contributions  
(Sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
0.767 
0.774 
0.787 
 
0.187 
0.159 
0.161 
 
0.085 
0.214 
0.226 
 
0.320 
0.269 
0.261 
0.030 
0.022 
0.020 
0.187 
0.156 
0.160 
-0.033 
-0.038 
-0.036 
-0.009 
-0.007 
-0.005 
 
Note: Weighted data from Surveys of Consumer Finances. The sample excludes households with negative net worth. 
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Table 4: Financial Wealth Inequality Decomposition by Sources 
 
 
Year 
Total 
Financial 
Wealth  
Wealth in 
Safe 
Financial 
Assets 
Wealth in 
Stocks 
Wealth in 
Indirectly 
held Equity 
Percentage 
with positive 
factor wealth 
(nf
+ )  
1989 
1998 
2001 
0.889 
0.931 
0.933 
0.889 
0.930 
0.929 
0.170 
0.197 
0.216 
0.242 
0.458 
0.489 
Factor Share 
(χƒ) 
 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.717 
0.464 
0.442 
0.152 
0.226 
0.213 
0.131 
0.310 
0.345 
Correlation 
with financial 
wealth 
(ρfF) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.908 
0.678 
0.804 
0.606 
0.840 
0.809 
0.442 
0.651 
0.646 
Factor 
Inequalities 
(Iƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
14.667 
21.984 
16.657 
16.667 
15.165 
18.433 
66.646 
162.514 
104.520 
53.095 
26.763 
12.684 
Within Factor 
Inequality  
(If
+ ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
12.990 
20.436 
15.501 
14.754 
14.065 
17.080 
10.911 
31.643 
22.158 
12.453 
11.992 
5.953 
Proportionate 
Factors    
contributions 
(sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.694 
0.261 
0.373 
0.196 
0.516 
0.432 
0.110 
0.223 
0.195 
Absolute 
Factors    
contributions 
(Sƒ) 
1989 
1998 
2001 
14.667 
21.984 
16.657 
10.173 
5.743 
6.221 
2.878 
11.337 
7.195 
1.617 
4.903 
3.241 
Percentage 
change in 
source 
contributions 
(sƒ%ΔSƒ) 
1998-
1989 
 
2001-
1998 
.498 
 
 
-.242 
-.302 
 
 
.022 
.577 
 
 
-.188 
 
 .224 
 
 
-.076 
 
Note: Weighted data from Surveys of Consumer Finances. The sample includes all households. 
 
 
 
   39
Table 5: Probit Regressions for Ownership of Equity Holdings 
  1989 1998 2001 
  Pseudo R
2:   0.26  Obs: 3,143  Pseudo R
2:   0.30  Obs:4,305  Pseudo R
2:   0.31  Obs:4,442 
  Log-likelihood:  -1599.99 Log-likelihood:  -2030.45  Log-likelihood:  -2018.36 
  Marginal Effect 
(z-value) 
Marginal Effect 
(z-value) 
Marginal Effect 
(z-value) 
Age .0303 
(7.98) 
*** .0298
(9.08)
*** .0170 
(5.28) 
*** 
Age squared  -.0002 
(-6.58) 
*** -.0002
(-7.77)
*** -.0001 
(-4.51) 
*** 
Male .0179 
(.5) 
 .0204
(.67)
 .0561 
(1.9) 
* 
High school 
Graduate 
.2285 
(7.97) 
*** .2769
(8.76)
*** .2528 
(8.4) 
*** 
College graduate  .4348 
(13.61) 
*** .4445
(14.37)
*** .4368 
(14.97) 
*** 
Married .1365 
(4.45) 
*** .1502
(5.43)
*** .1155 
(4.34) 
*** 
Kids -.0366 
(-1.69) 
* -.0163
(-.79)
 .0068 
(.32) 
 
White .1806 
(7.37) 
*** .1950
(8.25)
*** .1654 
(7.08) 
*** 
Self employed  -.0383 
(-1.62) 
 -.0943
(-3.75)
*** -.0677 
(-2.63) 
*** 
Retired -.0876 
(-2.8) 
*** -.1343
(-4.25)
*** -.1218 
(-3.67) 
*** 
Other non-working  -.1046 
(-2.02) 
** -.2448
(-5.25)
*** -.2096 
(-4.43) 
*** 
Save for “rainy 
days” 
-.0031 
(-.16) 
 -.0132
(-.64)
 -.0016 
(-.08) 
 
Financial Alertness  -.0279 
(-1.35) 
 .0438
(1.89)
* -.0006 
(-.03) 
 
Willingness to take above 
average  financial risk 
.1265 
(4.79) 
*** .2505
(11.86)
*** .2235 
(10.34) 
*** 
Health poor  -.1756 
(-4.34) 
*** -.1282
(-2.53)
** -.2605 
(-5.57) 
*** 
Log Income  .0145 
(4.46) 
*** .0193
(6.13)
*** .0294 
(6.34) 
*** 
Bequest .1422 
(7.06) 
*** .1811
(9.3)
*** .1709 
(8.97) 
*** 
Inherit .0386 
(1.85) 
* .1074
(4.75)
*** .0783 
(3.26) 
*** 
Credit constrained  -.0774 
(-2.8) 
*** -.0608
(-2.49)
** -.1175 
(-4.75) 
*** 
Note: *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. The sample consists of all households from SCF 
1989, 1998, 2001. Marginal effects refer to changes in the ownership probability associated with marginal changes in continuous variables 
(change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 is assumed), while the remaining covariates are fixed at their weighted means. The significance for 
each covariate has been computed using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. The joint significance for the variable groups of age, 
labor market status, and labor income were tested on the basis of LR tests (not reported): In all three cases, for all survey years, the parameter 
estimates were found jointly significant.      40
Table 6: Equity Holdings: OLS Regression Results 
 
  1989 1998 2001 
  log (equity)  log (equity)  log (equity) 
   R
2:   0.42  Obs: 1,481   R
2:   0.49  Obs:2,601          R
2:   0.54  Obs:2,822 
  Estimated Coefficient
(standard error) 
Estimated Coefficient 
 (standard error) 
Estimated Coefficient 
 (standard error) 
Age   .1439 
(.0256) 
***   .1521
(.0189)
*** .1506 
(.0164) 
*** 
Age squared  -.00084 
(.0002) 
***   -.00086
(.00018)
*** -.00082 
(.0002) 
*** 
Male   .5029 
(.2349) 
**    .2009
(.1508)
 .4913 
(.1537) 
*** 
High school 
Graduate 
.7852 
(.2219) 
*** .7544
(.2227)
*** .9853 
(.2099) 
*** 
College graduate   1.8507 
(.2246) 
***    1.7721
(.2221)
*** 2.1423 
(.2089) 
*** 
Married     .3278 
(.1935) 
* .4412
(.1260)
*** .3796 
(.1324) 
*** 
Kids   -.0824 
(.1212) 
   -.1549
(.0887)
* .1372 
(.0827) 
* 
White   .8292 
(.1995) 
***      .6294
(.1318)
*** .7821 
(.1100) 
*** 
Self employed    .5957 
(.1203) 
*** .6829
(.0997)
*** .7940 
(.0950) 
*** 
Retired     -.0787 
(.1829) 
   -.1444
(.1557)
   .5574 
(.1647) 
*** 
Other non-working   .8890 
(.5854) 
 .7214
(.4277)
*   1.2607 
(.3223) 
*** 
Save for “rainy 
days” 
 -.0856 
(.1061) 
   .1112
(.0882)
 -.1133 
(.0842) 
 
Financial Alertness    -.1241 
(.1152) 
    .3286
(.0968)
***   .3252 
(.0885) 
*** 
Willingness to take above 
average  financial risk 
   .8052 
(.1235) 
***    .8601
(.0837)
***    .7371 
(.0774) 
*** 
Health poor  -.6436 
(.3483) 
*   -.3719
(.2695)
    -.1310 
(.2849) 
 
Log Income  .0386 
(.0196) 
**   .0703
(.0224)
*** .0981 
(.0301) 
*** 
Bequest motive   1.1007 
(.1043) 
*** 1.4179
(.0831)
***   1.1760 
(.0799) 
*** 
Has received 
inheritance 
 .1041 
(.1056) 
   .2801
(.0876)
*** .0771 
(.0888) 
 
Credit constrained  -.8946 
(.2070) 
*** -.9272
(.1263)
*** -.9890 
(.1184) 
*** 
Constant 1.5507 
(.7578) 
** 1.6365
(.5718)
*** .8273 
(.5199) 
 
Note: *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. The sample consists 
of households with positive equity. The standard errors have been corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.   41
Table 7: Contributions to Inequality of Equity Holdings 
  
 s j s j s j 
  1989 1998  2001 
      
Age .3994 *  .3558*  ￿.4171  * 
Age Squared  -.2336 *  -.1889*  -.2177 * 
Male .0116 *  .0029  .0128  * 
High school 
graduate 
-.0336 * -.0335* -.0561  * 
College graduate  .0898 *  .0986*  .1483 * 
Married .0061   .0104*  .0132  * 
Kids .0033   .0024  -.0029   
White .0222 *  .0200*  .0281  * 
Self employed  .0155 *  .0174*  .0213 * 
Retired -.0027   .0040  .0189  * 
Other non-working  -.0005   0  -.0002 * 
Save for “rainy days”  .0007   -.0003  .0012  
Financial Alertness  .0003   .0031*  .0026 * 
Willingness to take above 
average  financial risk 
.0079 * .0267* .0240  * 
Health poor  .0018   -.0001  .0002  
log Income  .0035 *  .0067*  .0137 * 
Bequest motive  .0625 *  .0657*  .0512 * 
Has received inheritance  .0047   .0100*  .0029  
Credit constrained  .0383 *  .0511*  .0569 * 
Constant 0   0  0   
Residual .5960 *  .5200*  .4644  * 
 
        * Indicates statistical significance at the 95%  level of confidence. Standard errors 
have been derived by a method described in Morduch and Sicular (2002). 
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Table 8: Contribution of Variation in Educational Attainment to Inequality 
 
All households with positive equity (1998) 
  
Risky wealth 
(actual) 
 
Risky Wealth after removing 
the estimated effect of 
educational attainment* 
 
HSCV 23.84  8.44 
Gini .83  .79 
Theil 1.92  1.51 
 
Less than High School Education  (households with positive equity, 1998) 
HSCV 51.53  9.32 
Gini .70  .71 
Theil 1.26  1.03 
 
High School Graduates (households with positive equity, 1998) 
HSCV 23.44  9.80 
Gini .80  .79 
Theil 1.80  1.57 
    
College Graduates (households with positive equity, 1998) 
HSCV 17.95  7.02 
Gini .81  .79 
Theil 1.77  1.51 
 
* estimated coefficients derived from the quantile regression that produced the closest fitted value to the 
observed wealth level for each household. 
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Table 9: Simulated Inequality in Stock Holdings, by Education Category and Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age Mean HSCV Mean HSCV Mean HSCV
25 31778 0.02874 17643 0.02615 733 0.34827
35 71858 0.00811 64175 0.02353 5715 0.05691
45 75391 0.00701 83395 0.01204 22944 0.04725
55 64854 0.00725 75542 0.01407 56868 0.05972
65 46004 0.00925 56703 0.01844 47909 0.07666
75 22153 0.01129 24041 0.05999 17163 0.19092
85 7988 0.01353 2887 0.24062 2969 0.15131
High School Education College Degree or More Less-than-high-school Education  44
 
             Table 10: Characteristics of Direct and Indirect Stockholders (%) 
 
 1998  2001 
Education          
Less than high school education    5.51    4.95 
High school graduates   48.04   45.94 
College degree or more   46.45   49.11 
Use of professional advice    58.7   56.8 
Investment decisions influenced by social 
interactions 
  53.2   50.0 
Mean income  75,766 84,585 
   45
 
Table 11: Incidence of Cumulative Gains or Losses in Stock Value since Purchased,  
by Education Group (%) 
 
Direct Stockholding       Holders by Educational Attainment 
1998 
    All 
Holders  Less than  
High School  
Education 
High School 
Graduates 
College Degree 
or More 
Cumulative  Gains  79.7  73.19 78.67 80.92 
No Gains or Losses  8.46  15.38  9.68  7.04 
Cumulative  Losses  11.86  11.43 11.66 12.05 
2001 
Cumulative  Gains  52.7  41.24 48.66 55.66 
No Gains or Losses  12.03  15.92  13.41  11.39 
Cumulative  Losses  35.3  42.83 37.93 32.94 
          46
 
Table 12: Incidence of Cumulative Gains or Losses in Mutual Fund Value since Purchased, 
by education group (%) 
  
Mutual Funds  By Educational Attainment 
 
 
1998 
  All 
Holders  Less than  
High School  
Education 
High School 
Graduates 
College Degree 
or More 
Cumulative  Gains  87.2  69.08 84.64 88.65 
No Gains or Losses  6.7  17.38  7.29  7.21 
Cumulative Losses  6.0  13.54  8.07  4.14 
 
2001 
Cumulative Gains  54.1  27.8  49.98  56.12 
No Gains or Losses  10.9  20.07  13.96  9.32 
Cumulative  Losses  35.1  52.11 36.06 34.57 
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Table 13: Determinants of Cumulative Gains or Losses in Direct Holdings of Stock,  
since Purchased, by Education Group 
 
1998 2001 
Pr(Gains)
1 Pr(Losses)
1 Pr(Gains)
2 Pr(Losses)
2 
 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
Age  -.0023389 
(-.46) 
.00231654 
(.60) 
-.0054361 
(-1.20) 
.0100793 
(1.89)* 
Age Sq.  .00002691 
(.58) 
-.0000341 
(-.96) 
.000084 
(2.00)** 
-.0001227 
(-2.40)** 
Male  -.07455393 
(-1.78) 
.04224038 
(1.32) 
.0135258 
(.22) 
-.0336025 
(-0.58) 
High school 
graduate 
.03656977 
(.48) 
-.01240599 
(-.20) 
.101065 
(1.18) 
-.0197851 
(-0.25) 
College graduate  .09047864 
(1.19) 
-.00637648 
(-.10) 
.180919 
(2.15)** 
-.087737 
(-1.12) 
Married  .07909811 
(2.14)** 
-.0650072 
(-2.25)** 
.017898 
(.39) 
-.0145527 
(-0.34) 
Kids   -.01271558 
(-.50) 
-.00306919 
(-.16) 
.0354305 
(1.10) 
-.0392481 
(-1.28) 
White  .05635086 
(1.26) 
.00995091 
(.29) 
.1047763 
(1.96)** 
-.0790369 
(-1.53) 
Self employed  -.01745548 
(-.65) 
.00563342 
(.26) 
-.0845861 
(-2.55)** 
.0661579 
(2.03)** 
Retired  -.00539696 
(-.14) 
-.00120293 
(-.04) 
-.0651025 
(-1.28) 
.0207647 
(.43) 
Other non-working  .14539065 
(1.84)* 
- 
 
-.026199 
(.27) 
.0025594 
(.03) 
Has received 
inheritance  
.04484359 
(1.94)* 
-.02601489 
(-1.40) 
.1015051 
(3.52)*** 
-.0798458 
(-2.89)*** 
Log (income)  .00160171 
(.54) 
-.00162536 
(-.67) 
-.0009237 
(-.28) 
-.001092 
(-.29) 
Number of stocks 
held 
.00163953 
(2.38)** 
-.00102856 
(-1.72)* 
.0012759 
(2.68)*** 
-.0012624 
(-2.17)** 
Investment  
Horizon > 10 yrs 
.02375873 
(.96) 
-.0390416 
(-2.03)** 
.0611743 
(1.98)** 
-.0661785 
(-2.28)** 
Use of professional 
advice 
.03287112 
(1.37) 
-.02864962 
(-1.48) 
-.0463414 
(-1.57) 
.0119633 
(.43) 
Rho^  - -  -.474 
[se:.112] 
.385 
[se:.139] 
p, predicted 
(at mean X of 
stockholders) 
.82 .11  .54  .34 
 
*** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10% 
1 marginal effects from the estimation of a probit over the sample of stockholders  
2 conditional marginal effects from the second step of a bivariate probit with selection which 
takes into account the unobserved correlation with the probability of stock ownership. All 
marginal effects refer to changes in the probability of the occurrence of the event with 
marginal changes in continuous variables (change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 is 
assumed) by fixing the other covariates at their weighted means.    48
Table 14: Determinants of Cumulative Gains or Losses in Stockholding through 
Mutual Funds, since Purchased, by education group 
 
1998 2001 
Pr(Gains)
2 Pr(Losses)
1 Pr(Gains)
1 Pr(Losses)
1 
 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
marginal effect 
(z value) 
Age  .0029294 
(.07) 
-.0040627 
(-1.19) 
.00392612 
(.51) 
.00423176 
(.59) 
Age Sq.  -.0000225 
(-.06) 
.00003271 
(1.04) 
.00001153 
(.16) 
-.00007389 
(-1.11) 
Male  .0188069 
(.38) 
-.01930717 
(-.60) 
.17629088 
(2.49)** 
-.16330328 
(-2.35)** 
High school 
graduate 
.0797791 
(1.24) 
.02507216 
(.40) 
.18129412 
(1.47) 
-.15512459 
(-1.45) 
College graduate  .1094941 
(1.35) 
.01078119 
(.18) 
.30004282 
(2.46)** 
-.21927268 
(-2.00)** 
Married  -.0264926 
(-.69) 
.01925676 
(.76) 
-.06791571 
(-1.14) 
.07520575 
(1.33) 
Kids   .0043038 
(.16) 
-.03388387 
(-1.82)* 
.04814517 
(1.27) 
-.03609304 
(-1.01) 
White  .0508445 
(1.04) 
.01353853 
(.45) 
.25100417 
(3.82)*** 
-.16747345 
(-2.66)*** 
Self employed  -.0157928 
(-.56) 
.00534963 
(.27) 
-.05594937 
(-1.49) 
.04199647 
(1.17) 
Retired  .0064329 
(.16) 
.00296968 
(.12) 
-.07304613 
(-1.23) 
.00820164 
(.14) 
Other non-
working 
.1454296 
(8.56)*** 
- -.06655252 
(-.58) 
.05902038 
(.54) 
Has received 
inheritance  
.0413743 
(1.72)* 
-.00565956 
(-.34) 
-.00328647 
(-.10) 
-.02080618 
(-.65) 
Log (income)  -.0139016 
(-.46) 
-.00097149 
(-.41) 
.00226422 
(.34) 
-.0089859 
(-1.46) 
Number of shares in 
different mutual funds 
.0386958 
(.43) 
-.00684199 
(-2.67)*** 
.01472865 
(4.05)*** 
-.015088 
(-4.06)*** 
Investment  
Horizon > 10 yrs 
.0281496 
(1.12) 
.00673717 
(.37) 
.07280991 
(2.08)** 
-.08425331 
(-2.54)** 
Use of  
professional 
advice 
.0410372 
(1.56) 
-.00492573 
(-.28) 
-.05997609 
(-1.73)* 
.03653641 
(1.11) 
Rho^  -.643 
[se:.177] 
- -  - 
p, predicted 
(at mean X of 
stockholders) 
.87 .06  .55  .35 
*** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10% 
1 marginal effects from the estimation of a probit over the sample of stockholders  
2 conditional marginal effects from the second step of a bivariate probit with selection which 
takes into account the unobserved correlation with the probability of stock ownership. All 
marginal effects refer to changes in the probability of the occurrence of the event with 
marginal changes in continuous variables (change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 is 
assumed) by fixing the other covariates at their weighted means.   49
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Directly and Indirectly Equity Wealth densities for 1998 and 1989 
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Note: The estimation procedure is a kernel-density smoother on weighted data with a 
Gaussian kernel and an optimal bandwidth provided by STATA algorithm. 
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Figure 2A. Quantile Regression Decomposition 1998-1989:  
Coefficient and Covariate effects 
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Figure 2B. Quantile Regression Decomposition 1998-1989: 
Contributions of Fundamentals to Covariate effects 
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Figure 3A. Quantile Regression Decomposition 2001-1998: 
Coefficient and Covariate effects 
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Figure 3B: Quantile Regression Decomposition 2001-1998: 
Contributions of Fundamentals to Covariate effects   
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Data Appendix 
 
I.  Asset Categories for Financial Wealth  (Table 4) 
 
Directly held stocks: [1] 
  [1] publicly traded stocks 
 
Indirectly held equity: [2] + [3] + [4] + [5] 
  [2] stock mutual funds (full value if described as stock mutual fund, 
       1/2 value of combination mutual funds) 
  [3] IRAs/Keoghs invested in stock (full value if mostly invested in stock,  
       1/2 value if split between stocks/bonds or stocks/money market, 
       1/3 value if split between stocks/bonds/money market). 
  [4] Other managed assets w/equity interest: annuities, trusts, MIAs (full value if   
        mostly invested in stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks/MFs & bonds/CDs,  
        or "mixed/diversified", 1/3 value if "other") 
  [5] thrift-type retirement accounts invested in stock (full value if mostly invested in   
        stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks and interest earning assets). 
 
Safe Assets: Total Financial Assets – Directly held stocks – Indirectly held equity 
 
 
II. Asset Categories for Net Total Wealth  (Tables 2&3) 
 
Risky Financial Assets:   Directly held stocks + Indirectly held equity 
Safe Financial Assets: Total Financial – Risky Financial 
 
Net Wealth in Risky Real Assets & Business Equity: [1] + [2] + [3] – [4] − [5] 
[1]  Other Residential Real Estate (includes land contracts/notes household has made, 
properties - other than the principal residence - classified under certain codes for 
family residences, time shares and vacations homes) 
[2]  Gross equity in Non-residential Real Estate (real estate - other than the principal 
residence, properties classified under certain codes for family residences, time shares, 
and vacation homes) 
[3] Business Equity (for businesses where the HH has an active interest, value is net 
equity if business were sold today, plus loans from HH to business, minus loans from 
business to HH not previously reported, plus value of personal assets used as 
collateral for business loans that were reported earlier; for businesses where the HH 
does not have an active interest, market value of the interest)  
[4] Debt for Other Residential Property  (includes land contracts, residential property 
other than the principal residence, misc. vacation, and installment debt reported for 
cottage/vacation home) 
[5] Debt for non-residential real estate mortgages and other loans taken out for 
investment real estate 
 
Other Wealth: value of vehicles + other non-financial miscellaneous assets 
Wealth in Primary Residence: Gross value of primary residence 
 
 
  53
Principal Residence Debt: [6] 
[6] Principal Residence Debt (mortgage, home equity loans and HELOCs --mopup 
LOCs divided between HE and other) 
 
Consumer Debt: [7]+[8]+[9]+[10] 
[7] Other lines of credit 
[8] Credit Card Debt 
[9] Installment loans 
[10] Other Debt (loans against pensions, loans against life insurance, margin loans, 
miscellaneous) 
 
 
III. Variable Definitions 
 
No high school diploma (omitted variable): Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & 
No high school diploma or passed equivalent test (X5902=5) 
High school graduate:  Highest grade completed (X5901)<12 & Has got high school 
diploma (X5902=1) or passed equivalent test (X5902=2) OR Highest grade 
completed (X5901)=12 OR  Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & No college 
degree (X5904=5) 
College graduate: Highest grade completed (X5901)>12 & Has got a college degree 
(X5904)=1 
 
Save for “rainy days”: The survey question is “Now I'd like to ask a few questions 
about your (family's) savings. People have different reasons for saving.  What are 
your (family's) most important reasons for saving?” The dummy refers to those 
reporting one of the following reasons: Emergencies; “rainy days”; other unexpected 
needs; for "security"/independence (X3006=25 or X3007=25). 
 
Financial alertness: The survey question is “When making major saving and 
investment decisions, some people shop around for the very best terms while others 
don't. What number would you be on the scale?” 
The 5-number scale ranges from 1-“almost no shopping” up to 5-“a great deal of 
shopping”. The dummy represents those declaring that they do a great deal of 
shopping (X7111=5). 
 
Credit constrained: Indicates household response that it has been turned down for 
credit in the past five years or did not receive amount originally requested or did not 
apply for credit because it thought it might be turned down. 
 
Willingness to take above average financial risk: The survey question is “Which of 
the following statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you and 
your (spouse/partner) are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
            1.  take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
            2.  take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
            3.  take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
            4. not willing to take any financial risks” 
The dummy represents those answering 1 or 2. (X3014=1 or X3014=2). 
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Health poor: The survey question is “Would you say your health is excellent, good, 
fair, or poor?” Those describing their health as being poor are represented by the 
dummy (X6030=4). 
 
Income: income from wages, salaries, professional practice or business 
unemployment compensation, social security, annuity, or other pensions. 
 
Bequest motive: Yes to “Do you expect to leave a sizable estate to others?” 
(X5825=1). 
Has received inheritance: Yes to “Have you ever received an inheritance, or been 
given substantial assets in a trust or in some other form?” (X5801=1). 
 
Cumulative gains/losses in direct holdings of stocks: The survey asks stock holders 
if there is a gain or loss in the value of the currently held stocks since they obtained 
them (X3916). The same information is available for mutual fund holders (X3831) 
 
Number of stocks held: The survey asks stock holders in how many different 
companies they own stocks (X3914) and mutual fund holders in how many mutual 
funds they own shares (X3820) 
 
Investment Horizon>10 years: The dummy represents those declaring that a period 
longer than 10 years is important when making their family’s saving and spending 
plan (X3008) 
 
Access to professional advice: “How do you make decisions about savings and 
investments?” (X7112-X7121 & X6865-X6869) The dummy comprises those asking 
advice from at least one of the following: accountant, banker, broker, financial 
planner   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For participation trends in the United States since the early 1980s, see Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 
(2001). International comparisons can be found in the volume edited by Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli 
(2001). 
2 For effects of stock market participation on the equity premium, see for example Heaton and Lucas 
(1999), Peress (2001), Calvet et al. (2001).  For effects regarding market volatility, see Pagano (1989), 
Allen and Gale (1994), and Herrera (2001). 
3 Limited stockholding participation in the early to mid 1980s was documented in US data by King and 
Leape (1984), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). A number of authors have 
recently explored determinants of participation in stockholding. See, for example, Haliassos and 
Bertaut (1995), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1997), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Gollier (2001), 
Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), and Gomes and Michaelides (2004). 
4 The Survey excludes only households that belong to the Forbes 400. See also Kennickell (2001). 
5 As Atkinson (1983) points out, “[inequality indices] embody implicit judgments about the weight to 
be attached to the inequality at different points in the […] scale”. 
6 A similar argument was made by Jenkins (1995) in favor of using HSCV for analysis of income 
inequality. 
7 The result mainly comes from the increasing factor correlation, implying a stronger association 
between housing value and total net wealth over time, which outweighs the decreasing factor shares. 
Factor shares decrease presumably due to movements in housing prices, since ownership rates move in 
the opposite direction. 
8 The higher risky shares result from increasing ownership rates and sizeable stock gains in a decade 
marked by a spread of equity culture and a stock market boom. 
9 The unconditional share of investments in directly held equity as a fraction of total financial wealth 
declines from 22.6 to 21.3, as increased participation is dominated by lower stock valuations. This is 
not the case for unconditional shares of indirect equity holdings, which rise from 31.0 to 34.5 between 
1998 and 2001. 
10 The overall importance to inequality of a characteristic that is controlled for through a higher order 
polynomial or a string of dummy variables can be seen by adding up all the relevant coefficients (e.g. 
“age” in 2001 has a factor inequality weight of 20%= .41 -.21).  
11 Summary statistics suggest that by 1998 the stockholder pool became more heterogeneous. For 
instance, by the end of the decade in which equity culture spread, the share of college graduates among 
equity holders was actually somewhat reduced to 46.4%, while in the population it increased by almost 
6 percentage points. In addition, both the mean and median non-investment income among equity 
holders is lower in 1998 compared to 1989, while in the population it is considerably higher, by 15% 
and 10%, respectively. The picture changes drastically when we look at the composition of 2001 
stockholders. These consist mainly of those who persevered through the downswing and of those 
secure enough to enter the stock market at bad times. Within just three years, college graduates among 
equity holders reach 49.1%, an increase of almost 3 percentage points. They also show significant 
increases at all percentiles of their income distribution. 
12 Coefficient and covariate effects deviate across higher percentiles, and both are significant in most 
percentiles, according to bootstrapped standard errors not reported here. 
13 Yet another, fourth, approach to assessing quality of the stockholder pool would be to construct 
realized stockholding returns by household and then compare them to some stock market index over 
the relevant period. Whatever the merits of such an approach, it cannot be implemented in population-
wide data, because realized rates of return over specific periods cannot be computed. 
14 We return to this issue in our second approach. 
15 Households were assigned to percentiles of equity holdings by computing predicted equity holdings 
for each holder under all 19 sets of quantile regression coefficient estimates (evaluated at every five 
percentiles) and then finding the quantile for which the absolute distance between actual and estimated 
equity holdings is minimized. We use years of schooling instead of educational dummies, to retain 
more variation, especially in the small category of high-school dropouts that represents only 5% of the 
pool of stockholders. 
16  We have also experimented with the Machado Mata algorithm and have constructed several 
simulated counterfactual densities for 1998, raising the percentage of college graduates at the expense 
of the other two educational categories. By doing this, we progressively attach more weight to the 
group with the lowest within inequality. Indeed, the resulting counterfactuals display HSCVs that fall 
more rapidly than the college graduates’ share increases, lending further support to our finding that 
education has equalizing effects at the upper tail of the distribution.   56
                                                                                                                                            
17 According to the standard inequality decomposition by subgroups, HSCV can be expressed as the 
sum of within group and between groups inequality. Given that, after removing the effect of education, 
HSCV is reduced within each education category, and that it reaches a similar level (lower between 
groups inequality), it is natural to expect a reduction in HSCV among stockholders. Indeed within and 
between inequalities drop from 23.7 and .135 to 8.44 and .00053 respectively, after removing the effect 
of education.   
18 A fuller description of the model, algorithm, and policy functions is in Bilias and Haliassos (2004). 
19 For each education group, we draw 15,000 life histories of such shocks (one triplet for each year in 
the lifetime of each household), and we use those and the policy functions for holdings of stocks and of 
the riskless asset to compute stock holdings over the life cycle of each household. 
20 Results in this Section are robust to controlling also for net total wealth excluding direct holdings of 
stocks and of stocks in mutual funds. 
21 Because of the cross-sectional nature of the SCF, there is no information on households who left the 
market because of losses. CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2005/11  Markus Haas 
Stefan Mittnik 
Marc S. Paolella 
Modeling and Predicting Market Risk With 
Laplace-Gaussian Mixture Distributions 
2005/12  Dirk Krueger 
Felix Kubler 
Pareto Improving Social Security Reform when 
Financial Markets are Incomplete!? 
2005/13  Keith Kuester
  
VolkerWieland 
Insurance Policies for Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area 
2005/14  Berc Rustem 
Volker Wieland 
Stan Zakovic 
Stochastic Optimization and Worst-Case Analysis 
in Monetary Policy Design 
2005/15  Dirk Krueger 
Fabrizio Perri 
Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption 
Inequality? Evidence and Theory 
2005/16  Klaus Adam 
Roberto Billi 
Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero Lower 
Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 
2005/17  Roberto Billi  The Optimal Inflation Buffer with a Zero Bound on 
Nominal Interest Rates 
2005/18  Christopher D. Carroll  The Method of Endogenous Gridpoints for Solving 
Dynamic Stochastic Optimization Problems 
2005/19  Yunus Aksoy 
Athanasios Orphanides 
David Small 
Volker Wieland 
David Wilcox 
A Quantitative Exploration of the Opportunistic 
Approach to Disinflation 
2005/20  Yannis Bilias 
Dimitris Georgarakos 
Michael Haliassos 
Equity Culture and the Distribution of Wealth 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  